Fordham Law Review
Volume 19

Issue 2

Article 2

1950

The Deep Rock Doctrine Reconsidered, II
David C. Bayne, S.J.

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
David C. Bayne, S.J., The Deep Rock Doctrine Reconsidered, II, 19 Fordham L. Rev. 152 (1950).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol19/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

THE DEEP ROCK DOCTRINE RECONSIDERED, II*
DAVID C. BAYNE, SJ.t

THE detailed factual delineation, the step-by-step progression through
the Deep Rock litigation, and the analysis of the adjudication
from the aspect of its intrinsic reasonableness have laid a broad foundation for a consideration in the remaining pages of the full implications
of the opinion as a formulated doctrine to be applied by the courts as
a precedent.
Any difficulty attendant on possible factual obscurity has been removed. The study of the adjudication has yielded an understanding
of the duty of the Court as a court of equity: full justice to all parties.
The question before the Court was clear: the claim, the counter-claim
and the over-all equity. Analysis of the opinion has led to the conclusion that the Court proceeded from well-reasoned ultimate factual
determinations, indicating an application in its full force of the Instrumentality Principle, to what, it has been submitted, is a repudiatiort of
that principle, or at the least a failure to carry it through to its reasonable conclusion. This was the principal point of the early parts of this
commentary.
These are the materials from which to produce an evaluation of the
Deep Rock decision as a doctrine. Yet it should not be understood
that all these materials are of equal importance. The central point of
the Deep Rock adjudication must remain the allowance of the Standard
claim in the face of the general indicia pointing to disallowance, and
the misposition of that claim behind the publicly held preferred stock,
but ahead of the publicly held common stock.
PART IV: DEEP RocK As A DOCTRINE

Logical procedure would demand at this point a definition of the
doctrine. Since the very burden of this study will result in that definition, something tentative must suffice.
Of interest to this purpose is the definition of Professor Berle. 4 ' After
enumerating the traditional requisites for breach of the corporate veil,
Professor Berle instances Deep Rock as a case where courts will, in
order to protect the public shareholders of a subsidiary, disregard the
t Member of the District of Columbia Bar.
* This is the second of two articles by Mr. Bayne on the Deep Rock case. The first
article contained: PART I: ANemcmExns; PART II: LiTIGATION and PART III: ANALYSIS or
=a ADjuDIcATIoN. This article contains PART IV: DEEP Rocx AS A DoCTRINE and
PART V: SUBSEQUENT HISTORY or Tan Doc mNE, AND CoNcLusIoN.
148.

BERLE AND WARREN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS
155, 156 (1947).
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corporate entity. In this definition, moreover, there is no mention of
either allowance of the parent's claim nor its misposition ahead of the
common stockholders, but simply subordination of a debt due the parent
(the validity of the claim is presumed) to the claims of the preferred
shareholders. It is quite obvious that Professor Berle regards, or would
like to regard, the Deep Rock doctrine as an elaboration of the Instrumentality Doctrine.
It is grouped in that category in his book and
defined as such above. Since Professor Berle is not alone in his desire
to group Deep Rock with the traditional instrumentality cases, a short
review of the instrumentality tradition may place the Deep Rock case
in proper perspective.
Before Deep Rock-The Instrumentality Cases
Deep-rooted in the law of corporations is the theory of separate
corporate entity. The corporation is a juridical person, possessed of its
own individuating notes, character and personality. It is "a fictitious
personality with independent entity."'1 0 In accordance with the classic
statement, of which that contained in Salomon v. A. Salornon & Co.,
is typical, the corporation has always been regarded as a "legal entity
distinct from... the then members who composed it.... The company
is ex hypothesi a distinct legal persona."' From the very fact that this distinct corporate entity is a legal fiction,
it follows that there will be times when the continued use of that fiction
must result in inequity. Many such occasions have manifested themselves. They have taken on different guises, but the courts have had
the tendency to group their designation under the one, or a kindred,
title: "disregard of the corporate entity".
What this concept comes down to is a generalization deduced from
many particularizations, an attempt at a universal rule of equity. It has
been called a fiction oddly employed to look through a fiction. This may
be one good way of designating it. Actually the many variations of
conditions under which equity demands that the corporate fiction be
ignored render a generalization difficult, but at the same time such a
general rule is altogether possible.
Thus there are certain conditions and results that are always present
in these cases of "piercing the corporate veil."' s Where the parent
149. Professor Berle is far more circumspect in his article, Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 CoL. L. REv. 343 (1947). But the same stand on the Deep Rock doctrine
is present.
150. BErn AN W.mN, op. cit. supra note 148, at 156.
151. [1897] A. C. 22. See also Broderip v. Salomon, [1895] 2 Ch. 323.
152. Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co., [1897] A. C. 22, 42.
153. Wor=sa, THE DisRGADm or CORPORATE FICio.ND Au=D
COPOnmTE PoorzMs
42 (1927).
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corporation has set up a subsidiary as a mere front, a dummy, the veil
will be pierced and the parent will be held liable for its own actions
performed under the guise of its instrumentality. The indicia detailed
so elaborately by the Court in the Deep Rock case result in identity and
hence generally in liability of the parent.5 4 On this the textwriters are
in accord. For instance "the parent corporation will be responsible for
the obligations of its subsidiary";"' "liability is imposed to reach an
equitable result";6 "the courts disregard the corporate entity at least
to the extent of attaching the liabilities of the corporation to the t5person
7
or corporation really furnishing the basic assets and operation.'1
The instance which is generally accepted as one of the first applications of this theory is In re Watertown Paper Co."5 8 There the court
expressed the rule to the effect that the corporate entity may be disregarded where a corporation is so organized and controlled, or its
affairs so conducted as to make it merely an instrumentality or adjunct
of another corporation. Since that day in 1909, the courts have followed
with a continuous series of such adjudications reducible to the general
rule already noted. In the well known Chicago, M. & St. Paul Ry.
v. Minnesota Civic Ass'ni50 the Court stated that where stock ownership has been used for the purpose of controlling a subsidiary company
as a mere agency or instrumentality, the courts will not permit themselves to be deceived by mere forms of law, but, regardless of fictions,
will deal with the substance of the transaction involved as if the corporate agency did not exist and as justice may require.
Mention need be made of only a few other decisions to illustrate the
principle.1 0 In 1920 the Circuit Court disregarded the corporate entity
154. The important element in the word "liability" as used in this context is responsibility. That might have been a better word to have used throughout. Thus it is really
responsibility for one's own acts regardless of whither or to whom the responsibility flows.
The "whither and to whom" is determined after responsibility is first determined through
identity. The responsibility in one case might flow to third party creditors, in another
to tort claimants, and so on, whereas in Deep Rock the responsibility of Standard for
acts done nomine Deep Rock would accrue to Deep Rock creditors, but also and more so
to the public shareholders of Deep Rock's stock. The responsibility to third party creditors
is not essentially different from the liability to third party minority public shareholders.
Thus the order of progression in enunciating this doctrine would be this: first, identity of
corporations; second, responsibility for acts and duties; third, determination of the nature
and direction of such responsibilities.
155.
156.

POWELL, PARENT AND SUBSmIARY CORPORATIONS 8 (1931).
LATTY, SUaSmLRS AND ArFFiATED CORPoRATIONS 191 (1936)."
BERLE AND WARREN, op. cit. supra note 148, at 155.

157.
158. 169 Fed. 252, 256 (2d Cir. 1909).
159. 247 U. S.490 (1918).
160. The more outstanding cases in the instrumentality tradition are: Davis v. Alexander, 269 U. S. 114 (1925) ; United States v. Reading Co., 253 U. S. 26 (1920) ; Hart Steel
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in Luckenbaci Steamship Co. v. W. R. Grace & Co.'0 ' Luckenbach
owned 94% of the Luckenbach Steamship Company and 90% of the
Luckenbach Company. Hence both were controlled by the same shareholders. What the court did was to hold the Luckenbach Company
liable for a default of the Steamship Company on a contract for freight
carriage. Actually there was no evidence of direct intervention, either
in general or in the particular instance involved in the litigation. But
the Luckenbach Company, with a capital of $800,000, owned and leased
eight or nine steamers, worth hundreds of thousands of dollars, to the
Steamship Company which had a capital of only $10,000. The rentals
were far less than the actual rental value of the ships. The result? The
courts held the companies "identical" concluding that for all practical
purposes the two were one and that it would be unconscionable to allow
the owner of a fleet of steamers worth millions of dollars to escape liability because it had turned them over a year before to a $10,000 corporation, which was simply itself in another form. The similarity in
expression, and the identity in concept, between the words of the Circuit
Court and the words of Judge Bratton in the Circuit Court dissent in
Deep Rock demand remark: ". . . the assertion of a claim in such
circumstances amounts to the presentation of a claim against itself .
,,1. The Luckenbach case presents a simple form of the usual
procedure. Shorn of the complexities of Deep Rock it illustrates the
principle and points clearly to the requisite equitable outcome.
Wallace v. Tulsa Yellow Cab Taxi & Baggage W
Co.1 was an instance
where the facts indicated instrumentality and consequent responsibility.
The plaintiff sought and recovered a $7,000 judgment in tort for a
personal injury received from a cab operated under the name of the
Yellow Cab Service Company. But the judgment was not collectible.
The Yellow Cab Service Company had no realizable assets. In fact it
had gone out of business, and the good-will, assets and business were
now in the hands of the Tulsa Yellow Cab Taxi & Baggage Company.
When the facts came out it appeared that the Yellow Cab Service Company had been incorporated with only $1,000 in capital to remove the
necessity of public liability insurance on the part of the already operating
Tulsa Company. This kept the substantial assets of the Tulsa Company
out of the way and left the depleted treasury of the Yellow Cab Service
Co. v. Railroad Sup. Co., 244 U. S. 294 (1917); United States v. Delaware L. & NV. R.R,
238 U. S. 516 (1915); United States v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 220 U. S. 257 (1911);
McCaskill Co. v. United States, 216 U. S. 504 (1910).
161. 267 Fed. 676 (4th Cir. 1920), cert. denied, 254 U. S. 644 (1920).
162. Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 96 F. 2d 693, 703 (10th Cir. 1938).
163. 178 Okla. 15, 61 P. 2d 645 (1936).
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Company as the only source of satisfaction of tort losses. The court

remarked upon the substantial assets in the one, the total lack of assets
in the other, and outlined the obvious unity of the two. It declared that
the absolute control of the new corporation remained in the old through
its power to cancel the lease and take back the property necessary for
operation. This was a question of fact, not law. Since the new corporation was a mere instrumentality of the old, the court stated its duty
to look beyond the form to the substance of the transactions involved.
The fiction of separate legal entity was disregarded and the two corporations were held to constitute but a single entity, with the liability on
the parent. In Telis v. Telis'6 the defendant conveyed his property to
a dummy corporation which he had set up for the purpose of defeating
his wife's dower rights. The court refused to permit this and awarded
the wife her statutory right of dower in the premises. Here the responsibility, once determined, flowed in a different manner, but nonetheless
flowed.
In all of these decisions we find the same reasoning: first, identity of
stockholder and corporation; second, responsibility for acts and duties;
third, determination of the nature and direction of such responsibilities.
This is the logical sequence in these cases. The clear holding of the
Supreme Court of the United States in ConsolidatedRock Products Co.
v. DuBois' is noteworthy. In that case there had been a unified
operation of the several properties of the parent, Consolidated, pursuant to an operating agreement, resulting in extensive commingling of
assets. All management functions of the several companies were
assumed by the parent. The subsidiaries abdicated their independent
existence and Consolidated operated them as mere departments of its
own business, without the formalities of separate corporate organizations, except in minor particulars such as the maintenance of certain
separate accounts. In view of these facts, the Court held that Consolidated was in no position to claim that its assets were insulated from
claims of creditors of the subsidiaries. The Court stated:
"To the contrary, it is well settled that where a holding company directly
intervenes in the management of its subsidiaries so as to treat them as mere
departments of its own enterprise, it is responsible for the obligations of those
subsidiaries incurred or arising during its management.... A holding company
which assumes to treat the properties of its subsidiaries as its own cannot take
the benefits of direct management without the burdens."' 1 6
The tradition of the instrumentality cases would seem to indicate in
164. 132 N. J. Eq. 25, 26 A. 2d 249 (Ct. Err. & App. 1942).
165. 312 U. S. 510 (1941).
166. Id. at 524.
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a case such as Deep Rock full liability of parent, disallowance of the
parent's claim and allowance of the subsidiary's counterclaim, without
the unintelligible misposition of the parent's claim and the exclusion
of the minority common shareholders. Yet the conclusion in Deep Rock
was surely otherwise. It is submitted that the Deep Rock decision impugns the instrumentality tradition, or at least fails to follow the tradition in its full logic. Merely to prove that Deep Rock is not an advance
in the equitable instrumentality theory is alone insufficient to warrant
its abandonment as a doctrine, although certainly this argument is
suasive. Ultimately, the reason for rejection of the doctrine must be
reducible to some form of illogicality. In a sentence, Deep Rock impugns the Instrumentality Principle because of its basic illogicality and
it should be abandoned as a doctrine because this basic illogicality results in essential unpredictability.
Basic Illogicality
When a given process of reasoning is actually illogical, is a progression
from known acknowledged premises to inconsequent conclusions, that
reasoning process is unsound. When this particular instance of reasoning
is subjected to a generalization and accepted as a universal principle
for general application, that principle must perforce be also unsound.
If the action of the Court in Deep Rock is intrinsically illogical the
rule deduced from this instance will also be intrinsically illogical.
As illustration and corroboration of this thesis some hypothetical
applications of the Deep Rock doctrine should be helpful as a prelude
to a discussion of its actual application by the courts. Consider the
instance where the parent is just crafty enough to eliminate all open
account book claims, is foresighted enough to secure all claims with
valuable assets and hence is never under the necessity to come into court
with any unsecured claim. The force of the Deep Rock doctrine would
be nil. Or, suppose that the parent had an extensive bona fide claim
of say $10,000,000 and had milked the subsidiary only to the small
extent of a few thousand dollars, then would not an exact application
of the Deep Rock doctrine be unjustly punitive of the parent? Further,
picture something more similar to Deep Rock itself: no assets in the
defunct subsidiary, and a counterclaim against the parent in the amount
of $100,000,000. With a claim of the parent of $1,000,000 and outstanding preferred stock of $101,000,000, the court subordinates the
parent's claim to that of the perferred stock. Result: the parent loses
the $1,000,000 claim and the $100,000,000 counterclaim is ignored.
Furthermore, all these examples ignore the plight of publicly held
minority common stock. Consider only the one instance where the
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common stock amounts to $2,000,000 and the preferred stock to
$1,000,000 against $2,000,000 in assets. Into this picture comes the
parefit with a claim of $1,000,000 and a record of illicit and ,dominated
activity resulting in a spoliation of the subsidiary in the amount of
$2,000,000. The Deep Rock decision would appear to allow the parent's
claim, equal to the assets, ahead of the common stock. If the court,
however, disallowed the parent's claim and ordered its assumption of
responsibility for the $2,000,000 in milkings, the common stock would
be paid in full.
Uncertain Predictability
The unpredictability of the Deep Rock doctrine comes down to this,
that the mind of man cannot logically reenact under different facts an
illogical procedure. That is why there is uncertainty about the application of the so-called doctrine and that is why no one can predict
what will come of the next attempt. In the end the best evidence of
this unpredictability, and ultimately of the root illogicality of the doctrine, is the action of the courts in handling the concept embodied in the
Deep Rock opinion. Complementary to this evidence derived from
judicial decisions is the treatment accorded the doctrine by the writers
and legal commentators. Moreover, analysis of what later courts did
to the doctrine and what writers thought of it rounds out into an historical whole the treatment begun with the study of a few of the decisions antedating the Deep Rock.
PART V: SUBSEQUENT HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE, AND CONCLUSION

The Courts and the Doctrine
In the eleven years since the Supreme Court brought forth the Deep
Rock doctrine the higher federal courts have had resort to the Supreme
Court's opinion approximately fifty times. Standing back from these
later opinions a view of the Deep Rock doctrine in practical application
can be held up next to the view of Deep Rock already outlined in theory,
and the two views nlight well fit into the sides of a stereoscope. In conspectus what do these federal court opinions yield? Of the roughly fifty
occasions on which mention was made of Deep Rock by the higher
federal courts-The Supreme and Circuit Courts-about half of the
references were confined to strictly collateral points. The opinions containing these references do not warrant detailed consideration. Of the
remaining twenty-seven, categorization is indeed difficult. Roughly ten
of these decisions prescinded altogether from any niceties and simply
called on Deep Rock for support for the old-line Instrumentality Principle. They grouped Deep Rock with such traditional authorities for
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the Instrumentality Rule as United States v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 0 "
United States v. Reading Co.,les the Watertownc and Chicago Railroad"' cases. This is not difficult to understand, since a cursory reading,
with no studied advertence to the conclusions reached, might conceivably
leave the impression that the Deep Rock opinion does support the
Instrumentality Principle. Moreover, the use in Deep Rock of the
indicia of instrumentality and all of the preliminary instrumentality
discussion might understandably be cited by an unwary court, in spite
of the fact that later in the opinion the Supreme Court did not succeed
in applying the principle at all.
The remaining seventeen opinions could well be called a hodge-podge.
They represent the expressions of those judges who apparently had
occasion to consider Deep Rock carefully and who appeared to take
the decision for a variety of things, or adjudicated in a spirit clearly
contrary to the doctrine. Of these, those contra in spirit predominate
substantially. This predominance of cases contra in spirit is most important. The final box-score: 17 1 Instrumentality Principle: ten; contra
in spirit: eight; variation tantamount to straight equity: five; doubtful:
four.
The Supreme Court
There have been eight Supreme Court opinions which have resorted to Deep Rock for one reason or another. These opinions began in 1939112
and extend to 194871 Of these eight, four could be said to be implicitly
and indirectly contra to Deep Rock." 4 Two used Deep Rock simply as
an indication of the broad powers of the bankruptcy court,175 and the
other two merely mentioned the case.176 None made use of the "doc-

trine." None made use of Deep Rock for the decision of the case at bar.
167. United States v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 220 U. S. 257 (1911).
168. United States v. Reading Co., 253 U. S. 26 (1920).
169. In re Watertown Paper Co., 169 Fed. 252 (2d Cir. 1909).
170. Chicago, M. & SL Paul Ry. v. Alinn. Civic Ass'n, 247 U. S. 490 (1918).
171. It should be unnecessary to say that such blanket summaries are hazardous at
best, but this rsk is offset by the deduced over-all impression. Further, when the more
detailed analysis is mulled over, the conspectus above presented can be independently
evaluated.
172. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 303 U. S. 106 (1939).
173. Comstock v. Group of Institutional Investors, 335 U. S. 211 (1948).
174. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 30S U. S. 106 (1939); Pepper v. Litton,
308 U. S. 295 (1939); Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. DuBois, 312 U. S. 510 (1941);
and Comstock v. Group of Institutional Investors, 335 U. S. 211 (1948).
175. American Ins. Co. v. Avon Park, 311 U. S. 138 (1940); and Sampsell v. Imperial
Paper Corp., 313 U. S. 215 (1941).
176. Prudence Corp. v. Geist, 316 U. S. 89 (1942); and Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U. S.
726 (1946).
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The first Supreme Court decision citing Deep Rock was Case v.
Los Angeles Lumber Products Co.'" For the purposes of this study

the Case opinion comes first felicitously. It inveighs militantly against
subordination; 1 18 it restates the "fixed principle" of absolute priorities
of interested parties in corporate reorganizations, and it links up well
with Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. DuBois' 9 The spirit is contra
to Deep Rock. Inasmuch as the general philosophy of the Case opinion
was contrary to that of Deep Rock, it is understandable that any explicit reference to Deep Rock would have to be on a collateral point.
The Court could not well cite Deep Rock as authority for the usual
absolute priorities principle, or for denial of any subordination. For
this reason the actual reference to Deep Rock is used to support the
Court's action in rejecting a plan of reorganization, which had already
been approved by the requisite number of interested parties, on the
ground that the preferred stock of the debtor corporation was inequitably treated under the plan; merely because the vast majority of the
security holders have approved the plan is not the test of whether the
plan is a fair and equitable one. This was a valid citation and no one
would deny that Deep Rock stands for that much. The point, however,
in any long-range evaluation of Deep Rock, is that many other decisions
stand for the same thing and it is far and away from judicious to let
the questionable logic of Deep Rock persist merely to serve as such
minor assistance to the courts.
This was the Court's direct reference to Deep Rock. The indirect
references are more interesting. Citing Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville,
8
A. & C. Ry.,"'
the Court in the Case opinion affirmed the "familiar
rule" that the stockholder's interest in corporate property is subordinate
to the rights of creditors, first of secured and then of unsecured creditors,
and that any arrangement of the parties by which the subordinate rights
of stockholders are attempted to be secured at the expense of the prior
rights of either class of creditors is untenable.
177. 308 U. S. 106 (1939).
178. The use of the term "subordination" can be confusing. When used to signify
the hierarchical allocation of position pursuant to the traditional norms of priority in
bankruptcy or reorganization the act described by the term is consistent with good law.
When the term signifies the misposition of a security contrary to the traditional priorities,
as is the case in Deep Rock, the practice is reprobated, as by the Case opinion. Furthermore the variety of human circumstances makes it impossible to preclude the possibility
of an instance arising in which a certain form of subordination of one interest to another
must be effected to do justice, but such a case is not here referred to. In short, whenever
the term is used here it is referable to the specific type of subordination universalized as
a result of the Deep Rock opinion.
179. 312, U. S. 510 (1941).
180. 174 U. S. 674 (1899).
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It is interesting to reflect on the different result in Deep Rock had
the misposition of the Standard claim never been made. Had the Court
been forced to regard Standard as a real creditor perhaps the Court
would have hesitated at leaving Standard not only unscathed by the
counterclaim but collecting before the preferred stock. Had one
illogicality-the denial of the millions in counterclaim-not been covered
up by another-the misposition of the claim-the Court might have
abandoned both for the rationality of allowance of the counterclaim.
As little as the scrap of bread of subordination was, superficially it
looked fairly decent, and it succeeded apparently in satisfying many who
later read the Deep Rock opinion. In fine, the Case opinion decried such
subordination and much of the principle of Deep Rock. It should be
cited as the first in a series of opinions that are to contemn the principles of Deep Rock. The undermining of these principles may appear
erosive in a fleet observation, but actually the courts have said as much
against Deep Rock by simply contrary adjudication and rather bald
implication as has the elucidation of the theory in these pages. That
this, in general, is not entirely conscious or by advertence appears to be
manifest, since it would seem that otherwise the courts would refrain
from citing Deep Rock even for remotely collateral points.
Within the same year as Deep Rock, but in the following term, Mr.
Justice Douglas, who was seated after Deep Rock, wrote the opinion
in Pepper v. Litton.'8 ' The first words of the opinion refer to the question of the power of the bankruptcy court to "... disallow either as a
secured or as a general or unsecured claim a judgment obtained by the
dominant controlling stockholder of the bankrupt corporation on alleged
salary claims." ' 2 Even before the facts of the Pepper case are known,
it will pay to consider these opening phrases, for in them lies the sole
reason for the citation of Deep Rock. The Court desired support for
the broad, equitable jurisdiction of the court of bankruptcy. It claimed
the power and duty to sift the circumstances surrounding any claim to
see that injustice or unfairness is not done in administration of the
bankrupt estate. The Court felt its duty was especially clear when the
claim seeking allowance accrued to the benefit of an officer, director or
stockholder. It referred directly to Deep Rock:
"In Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 306 U. S. 307, this Court held
that the claim of Standard against its subsidiary (admittedly a claim due and
owing) should be allowed to participate in the reorganization plan of the subsidiary only in subordination to the preferred stock of the subsidiary. This
was based on the equities of the case...."163
181. 308 U. S. 295 (1939).
182. Id. at 296 (italics supplied).
133. Id. at 308.
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The Court went on to list the other types of equitable action permissible
to a court of bankruptcy. There has been mention of Deep Rock, but
it has been only for the purpose of indicating the broad powers of the
bankruptcy court as a court of equity. Hence, so far as it touches
directly on Deep Rock, the opinion in the Pepper case, first, uses it only
for collateral substantiation of equitable powers, and second, indicates
where Deep Rock was deficient in not, itself, exercising full equitable
powers-but this by implication only.
The words in the Pepper case opinion concern themselves only with
disallowance of the claim. Actually that is all that was done. Litton
was a one-man corporation, the Dixie Splint Coal Company. Pepper
had money due him from this corporation for rentals and sought an
accounting by suit in the state court of Virginia. Litton leaped in ahead
of Pepper and had his corporation confess judgment in favor of himself
in the amount of about $33,000 allegedly due as salary over a five year
period. If Litton's judgment were paid there would be no assets remaining at all for satisfaction of the Pepper rentals. There were other details whereby Litton safeguarded his $33,000, but these were the essential
facts. Such facts take the case essentially out of the pale of Deep Rock.
Litton was a one-man corporation, hence once the rentals due Pepper
were paid it really did not matter what happened to the corporation.
The only creditor defrauded was the one claimant; so mere disallowance
of Litton's claim would satisfy. There were no other claims which
would demand a further definite contribution by Litton to make such
claimants whole.
It is submitted that everything in the Pepper case points to a line
of reasoning exactly opposite to Deep Rock. Had Pepper been owed a
great sum which could only be satisfied by a contribution from the
sole stockholder, all indications are that the Court would have ordered
just such a contribution.
"He who is in such a fiduciary position cannot serve himself first and his
cestuis second. He cannot manipulate the affairs of his corporation to their
detriment and in disregard of the standards of common decency and honesty.
He cannot by the intervention of a corporate entity violate the ancient precept
against serving two masters .... Where there is a violation of these principles,
4
.... ,,1

equity will undo the wrong.

Intrinsically the Pepper case belonged in the line of the traditional instrumentality cases. This was evident passim throughout the opinion,
and in the basic result of the decision.
The third reference to Deep Rock came in 1940 in American Insurance
184. Id. at 311.
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Co. v. Avon Park." The reference was brief and on, a collateral point.
It served as a further reminder of the full equitable powers of the court
and of the duty of full justice to all parties. The Court claimed power
ample for the exigencies of varying situations, not dependent on express
statutory provisions and inherent in the jurisdiction of a court of
bankruptcy. This is a frequent use for Deep Rock. Clearly Deep Rock
indicated the possession and presence of the power. Just as clearly did
it indicate its abuse rather than proper use. Beyond this reference to
the powers of the bankruptcy court, the American Insurance Co. case did
not mention Deep Rock. Nor was there further that could be of interest
to this study.
The Consolidated case' was next, and came in 1941. The principles
of this decision weigh heavily against the Deep Rock doctrine. First,
it rebutted, in effectu, disallowance of the Deep Rock counterclaim by
an admission of the feasibility of arriving at the amount of a claim of
a subsidiary against the parent.'8 7 It saw no barriers to valuatiofi and
enforcement of the subsidiary's claim and declared that equity would
not permit a holding company, which has dominated and controlled its
subsidiaries, to escape or reduce its liability to those subsidiaries because
of difficulty and expense in establishing the claim. Second, it also
asserted the power of the bankruptcy court as a court of equity to adjudicate all of the issues pertinent to the claim. This was another implicit
thrust at the truncated disposition of the Deep Rock issues. Third, it
openly contemned subordination. Not only did it indicate the full ability
of the court of equity to estimate and allow the claim of the subsidiary
against the parent, but it specifically forbade misposition.I 88 Fourth, it
placed the decision in the line of cases following the traditional Instrumentality Principle and indirectly added another point against the Deep
Rock doctrine. (This point was discussed when treating the Consolidated case in the instrumentality line.) The Court stressed the point
that a holding company which assumes to treat the properties of its
subsidiaries as its own cannot take the benefits of direct management
without the burdens. Standard's burden was the amount of the counterclaim. And what of the actual mention of Deep Rock? Again, of
necessity it had to be on a collateral and relatively unimportant point.
There could be no direct citation of a decision so diametrically opposed
185. 311 U. S. 138 (1940).
186. Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. DuBois, 312 U. S. 510, 521, S22 (1941).
187. In the Deep Rock case the courts in effect disallowed Deep Rock's counterclaim
against Standard by the simple process of ignoring it. Despite the fact that the counterclaim was urged upon the courts, no opportunity appears to have been afforded to prove it.
No audit was ordered although the situation -eemed to call for an investigation.
188. Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. DuBois, 312 U. S. 510S,527 (1941).
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in spirit to the decision in hand. Mr. Justice Douglas cited Deep Rock
for the very general proposition that a holding company had fiduciary
duties to security holders. This was a point that hardly required Deep
Rock for support.
In the Consolidatedcase, beyond the one, lone direct citation, all goes
contra in tone to Deep Rock. It admits of the possibility of estimating
and evaluating the claim against the parent; it stressed the equity power
to do full justice, it condemned subordination; and it applied the Instrumentality Principle in achieving equities for all parties. All these factors
lead to the conclusion that Consolidated is outstanding in this study for
its off-set value as the antithesis of Deep Rock. It affords a fine example
of what the Court might have done in Deep Rock.
There remain only two lesser instances of resort to Deep Rock in
this treatment of the Supreme Court adjudications before we consider
Comstock v. Group of InstitutionalInvestors.18 0 Both were on collateral
matters, and both served their turn in eating away at the Deep Rock
doctrine. The first of these last two cases-Sampsell v. Imperial Paper
Co.'O0 -- was the fifth instance of reference to Deep Rock by the Supreme
Court. It stated that the powers of the bankruptcy court to subordinate
claims or to adjudicate equities arising out of the relationship between
the several creditors were complete. It added that the theme of the
Bankruptcy Act is equality of distribution. Then it cited Deep Rock.
The equality of distribution is a point in which Deep Rock suffered by
comparison. The second of these two cases of lesser importance is
Prudence Corp. v. Geist. 9 ' It came in 1942. This time the Court adverted directly to the power of subordination. The Court did not condemn the practice, but merely stated that it was unnecessary for the
Court to apply it; another instance where the Court quietly avoids the
application of the "doctrine". There cannot be said to be any explicit
repudiation in this avoidance, but in the light of the general treatment
accorded Deep Rock by the Supreme Court it can be instanced as more
of the erosive process by which the "doctrine" has been undermined.
There was no further reference in the Prudence Corp. case to Deep Rock.
The Comstock Case
From most aspects Comstock v. Group of InstitutionalInvestors9 2 is
the leading commentary on the Deep Rock doctrine in both Supreme and
Circuit Courts. The Comstock case can be said (1) to epitomize the
189.

335 U. S. 211 (1948).

190.

313 U. S. 215, 219 (1941).

191.
192.

316 U. S. 89, 93 (1942).
335 U. S. 211 (1948).
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general uncertainty surrounding Deep Rock; (2) to attempt, albeit inadvertently, to change its original meaning; (3) to exemplify the questionable logic and uncertain predictability at the base of the Deep Rock
opinion. The Court split five to four in the Comstock case and there
is essential variance throughout between the majority and the dissent.
The Majority in Comstock. The majority of the Court refused to
review the findings of fact made by the District Court 0 3 and affirmed
by the Circuit Court of Appeals, 94 relying upon the settled rule that
the Supreme Court will not review concurrent findings of two courts
below in the absence of a very exceptional showing of error. "s The
facts were that since 1933 the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company
(MoPAC) and its subsidiary, the New Orleans, Texas and Mexico Railway Company (NoTm), plus many affiliates, had been in reorganization
under Section 77 of the then National Bankruptcy Act. A second plan
of reorganization was approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission
and in 1944 was before the District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri when Comstock objected to the allowance of a claim of about
$10,500,000 by MoPAc against NOIM.

At all times

MOPAC

controlled

NOTm

by majority ownership of the

sole NOTM issue of capital stock and managed NoTM through common
officers. Throughout an expansion program MOPAC made advances to
NoTm and with the permission of the Interstate Commerce Commission
NoIM issued to MOPAc notes in excess of $10,000,000, which were in
turn pledged by MoPAC to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.
This was the claim to which Comstock objected. Comstock was the
holder of some of MOPAC'S 5Y % Secured Serial Bonds, which aggregated $13,000,000 and which were secured by the pledge of Nona stock
in equal face value. Thus Comstock had an interest in the stock of
NOTm and its assets which MOPAC'S claim, if allowed, would deplete.
He objected to the plan on the ground of MOPAC'S mismanagement and
more specifically charged that MOPAC caused NoTMA to pay dividends
out of capital and improvidently to declare and pay dividends unjustified by NoTM's condition and business and that MOPAC made loans to
NOTM in order to enable NoTM to pay dividends to MOPAc and caused
a Nom indebtedness growing out of the expansion. Comstock prayed
that MoPAc's claim be either disallowed or subordinated to the NOTIT
stock interest.
In a broad consideration of the entire case the majority of the Supreme
193. In re Missouri Pac. R.R., 64 F. Supp. 64 (1945).
194. Comstock v. Group of Institutional Investors, 163 F. 2d 350 (1947).
195. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U. S. 745 (1947) ; Stuart v. Hayden, 169 U. S. 1

(1898).
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Court agreed with the District and Circuit Courts that, while MOPAC
controlled NOTM, MOPAC'S claim "was the outgrowth of complicated
but legitimate good faith business transactions, neither in design or
effect producing injury to the petitioner or the interests for which he
speaks."',9 In specific reference to the dividends paid to MOPAC, in
the face of contemporary loans by MOPAC to NOTM in substantially the
same amounts, the majority referred to the findings of good faith and
the fact that the dividends were paid out of earnings or surplus.
Concerning Deep Rock the majority said:
"In that case this Court reformulated for application to reorganization cases
a wholesome equity doctrine to the effect that a claim against a debtor subsidiary be disallowed or at least subordinated when the claimant corporation
has wholly dominated and controlled the subsidiary and in the transactions
creating the debt has breached its fiduciary duty and acted both to its own
benefit and to the detriment of the debtor. As we later said of the decision,
'This was based on the equities of the case-the history of spoliation, mismanagement, and faithless stewardship of the affairs of the subsidiary by
Standard to
the detriment of the public investors.' Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S.
'
295, 308."'19
The holding of the majority moves the Comstock case outside the
pale of comparison with Deep Rock and hence any reference to Deep
Rock must necessarily have been obiter. Set off against the history of
spoliation in Deep Rock the facts as accepted by the majority in the
Comstock case indicate complete good faith and actual benefit to the
entire railroad system, including NOTM. Added to the absence of such
factual similarity the following points should be noted: (1) in Deep
Rock the Standard claim was never adjudicated on the merits; in
Comstock all three courts state that MOPAC'S claim was valid; (2) in
Deep Rock Standard's claim was actually allowed; in Comstock the
main plea was for disallowance which could never follow under the
Deep Rock holding in any event; (3) in Deep Rock there was the
inexplicable position of the allowed Standard claim ahead of the common
stock and behind the preferred; in Comstock there was only one type
of stock and hence misposition could not be similarly effected. Subordination would actually be disallowance; (4) NOTm had no counterclaim
against MOPAC.
All of these considerations disclose the inapplicability of the Deep
Rock decision. However, the obiter discussion of the majority indicates
conflict with the Deep Rock doctrine. The first notable conflict is in
the matter of the validity of the parent's claim. The Court takes pains
196.
197.

335 U. S. 211, 229 (1948).
Id. at 228.
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to point out that the claim was rightly adjudicated on the merits and
that the duty of the court of bankruptcy encompasses just such matters.
This is opposed in principle to the Deep Rock approach, especially where
the domination and spoliation in the latter case were so marked. Secondly, the Court depicts a situation parallel to what actually would have
happened in In re Kansas City Journal-Post Co., 08 infra, and emphasizes the punitive effects of such subordination. It "... would unjustly
enrich the holders of the Capital Stock of the New Orleans ....,"10 In
other words, even granting ex arguendo similarity between the facts in
the Comstock and Deep Rock cases, subordination as in Deep Rock
would not be the answer because NOTm did not have such a substantial
allowance coming to it as its due. Were the facts to indicate something
due NOTM, it still was not so much as the subordination of a
$10,000,000 claim would give it. The dissent points this out. Thirdly,
the majority of the Court in Comstock in summarizing what Deep Rock
had held indicates uncertainty as to whether Deep Rock stood for disallowance or subordination. It quoted the decision in the Pepper-0 case
as explicative of the Court's stand on Deep Rock repeating that the
Deep Rock holding was ".. . based on the equities of the case ....,*
Yet in Deep Rock the counterclaim was ignored, the claim allowed and
no reasons were adduced for either. To determine what Deep Rock
held we must go to Deep Rock itself rather than depend on what the
Court later says of the decision. Finally, the majority in Comstock felt
that Deep Rock deprived ". . . the wrongdoer of the fruits of his
wrong."2' 2 With Deep Rock's $20,000,000 counterclaim undetermined,
this is a debatable estimation of the Deep Rock holding.
The Dissent in Comstock. The dissenting opinion refused to apply
the rule that makes concurrent findings of two courts binding on the
Court, because it found exceptional error. The dissent found that
MOPAC made advances to NoTM, not for improvements, but for dividends and that MOPAC had made an inter-company adjustment at the
height of the depression shortly before the initiation of the reorganization proceedings, which had the effect of shifting from a less financially
responsible subsidiary of NOTAT to NoTM itself an indebtedness due to
MOPAC. Of the entire $10,500,000 claim of MOPAc against NOTM the
dissent found that the advances made for dividend purposes and the
inter-company debt, saddled upon NoIm, amounted to approximately
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

144 F. 2d 791 (8th Cir. 1944).
Comstock v. Group of Institutional Investors, 335 U. S. 211, 229 (1943).
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295, 308 (1939).
Comstock v. Group of Institutional Investors, 335 U. S. 211, 228 (1943).
Id. at 229.
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$4,000,000 and held that this amount of the claim should be subordinated to the claims of the pledgees of the NOTM stock. The dissent said:
"Indeed, the main thrust of Comstock's objection to this segment of the
MOP claim is directed toward the entire history of MOP's management of
NOTM. The thought is that the relationship of the parent and the subsidiary
has been so complex and so saturated with mismanagement as to warrant
subordination of the entire claim of the parent without bothering to differentiate between particular transactions. See Taylor v. Standard Gas Co., supra,
323. But the record does not support such an approach to the MOP-NOTM
relationship. There have been, as we have seen, two examples of mismanagement on MOP's part that warrant the application of the Deep Rock doctrine.
But those situations are separable in nature from the other transactions between MOP 'and NOTM. And the Deep Rock doctrine is not one that operates
to bar an entire parental claim if only a separable portion of it is inequitable.
It is only where, as in the Taylor case, the parent-subsidiary relationship
has been so complex that it is impossible to restore the subsidiary to the position
it would have been in but for the parent's mismanagement that the entire
claim may be subordinated without distinguishing the good transactions from
the bad. Such is not the situation in this case." 203

This offers an explanation neither of the misposition of Standard's
claim nor of the failure to examine into Deep Rock's counterclaim.
The dissent in Comstock takes what is submitted to be an ill-advised
course, but once on the way it approaches the Deep Rock doctrine in the
only manner consonant with the intrinsic reasoning of that opinion. It is
ill-advised in attempting to make anything of the doctrine. It acts as it
must, once embarked, by avoiding any exact application of Deep Rock
and by hacking away at the doctrine until there would seem to be little
left of the original. In one sentence the dissent gives the approach it
will take to Deep Rock: "And so the Deep Rock doctrine is as broad
and as narrow as the equities in each case."20 4 In other words, to the
dissent in Comstock Deep Rock is simply general equity acting within
the context of any of a multitude of parent-subsidiary relations. The
dissent makes it eminently clear that it is not going to entangle itself
in any exact definition of the Deep Rock doctrine. Illustrative of this
are the following. (1) The dissent would extend the doctrine to all
public shareholders, without the distinction made in Deep Rock between common and preferred. This is implied and obiter. (2) Deep
Rock would be extended beyond bad faith transactions. "The equities
which form the Deep Rock doctrine relate not alone to matters of bad
faith. They are also concerned with essential fairness and propriety of
203. Id. at 251.
204. Id. at 239.
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transactions from an objective standpoint.1 205 This is somewhat difficult
to understand, but it is even more difficult to find such principles in
Deep Rock. Certainly the Court in Deep Rock never adduced so many
and such reasons in support of its disregard of the Deep Rock counterclaim and the allowance of the Standard claim. (3) The dissent was
ready to alter the Deep Rock doctrine to cover insolvent parents, apparently not recognizing that Standard was actually insolvent:
"And the Deep Rock doctrine is not one that operates to bar an entire
parental claim if only a separable portion of it is inequitable. It is only where,
as in the Taylor case, the parent-subsidiary relationship has been so complex
that it is impossible to restore the subsidiary to the position it would have
been in but for the parent's mismanagement that the entire claim may be
subordinated without distinguishing the good transactions from the bad."2' 00
The dissent in Comstock had a choice in regard to Deep Rock. It
could say simply that the Deep Rock doctrine did not -apply or it could
state that the Deep Rock doctrine stood for the broadest type of equity
and then apply it just as it pleased. The dissent did the latter. Had it
done the former it would have lined up with the bulk of federal references to Deep Rock. In either case it would have acted exactly as the
Deep Rock doctrine requires. The Deep Rock doctrine can be approached in three ways: (1) direct overruling; (2) sidestepping; or
(3) liberal watering down. The Comstock dissent chose the latter in
appealing to equity principles. This the dissent would accomplish by
ignoring several elements of the Deep Rock doctrine and by converting
it into a broad equitable principle "... as broad and as narrow as the
equities in each case."2 7 But the point here is that the dissent was
using an unfit instrument to accomplish its end. Deep Rock simply did
not contain all the elements which the dissent would like it to have.
Comstock in overall substantiates admirably the thesis thus far and
illustrates in majority and dissent the general uncertainty, the inability
to apply the Deep Rock doctrine to a given fact situation, and the constant attempt either to change the doctrine to suit the case or to avoid
it altogether.
This concludes the analysis of the opinions of the Supreme Court in
which word of Deep Rock appeared. The important fact is that none
of the opinions directly rejected Deep Rock, that none of them openly
opposed it but in four of them were present principles contra to the
Deep Rock adjudication. Were it not for the Circuit Court opinions,
205. Id. at 238.
206. Id. at 251.
207. Id. at 239.
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and the writers, it might well be said that the courts needed no encouragement to abandon Deep Rock, that the Supreme Court had
already deserted it, and had declared openly'in the Case, Pepper, Consolidated and Comstock opinions principles and doctrine inherently opposed
to the Deep Rock doctrine. But to get the complete picture of the status
of the doctrine, the other federal court opinions must be considered.
The Circuit Courts
There have been roughly forty references to Deep Rock in the various
Circuit Courts of Appeals. Of these, about half are immediately excluded from study. They used Deep Rock for the most collateral matters, or mentioned it altogether obiter. Of the remaining cases about
half cited Deep Rock with the old-line instrumentality cases. The other
half are more difficult to classify. It is this remaining group which give
the fullest force to the suggestion "that some confusion exists as to the
actual nature oi the Deep Rock doctrine."2 08 In this group, for the
most part, the opinions contain either implicit rejection of the doctrine
or are based upon straight-line general equity principles, far from any
peculiarly Deep Rock reasoning.
To discuss each of the instrumentality applications of Deep Rock
would be profitless. What is needed is a prototype, since all of the
opinions cited Deep Rock and the traditional cases together as support
for the Instrumentality Principle. And the prototype. chosen adds a bit
of irony to the study, since it was handed down by the same three judges
who sat on the Circuit bench when Deep Rock was adjudicated. Fish
v. East,2 without a dissent, was handed down by Phillips, Bratton and
Williams, Circuit Judges. The opinion was by Williams, J., who had
formerly sided with Phillips, J., in agreeing that the Standard claim
should be allowed. The court began by stating that the corporate entity
may be disregarded where not to do so would defeat public convenience,
justify wrong or protect fraud. It was here that Deep Rock was first
cited. The court then declared that the determination as to whether a
subsidiary is an instrumentality is primarily a question of fact and
208. Note, The Deep Rock Doctrine: Inexorable Command or Equitable Remedy, 47
COL. L. REv. 800 (1947).
209. 114 F. 2d 177, 191 (10th Cir. 1940). The other decisions citing Deep Rock for
the Instrumentality Principle are: In re Clark Supply Co., 172 F. 2d 248, 254 (7th Cir.
1949); Godfrey v. Powell, 150 F. 2d 486, 489 (5th Cir. 1945); Great Northern Co-op.
Ass'n v. Bowles, 146 F. 2d 269, 271 (Emergency Court of Appeals, Wis. 1944); Nichols
& Co. v. Secretary of Agriculture, 131 F. 2d 651, 656 (1st Cir. 1942); Page v. Haverty,
129 F. 2d 512, 514 (5th Cir 1942) ; Weisser v. Mursam Shoe Corp., 127 F. 2d 344, 345 (2d
Cir. 1942); Inland Development Co. v. Commissioner, 120 F. 2d 986, 988, 989 (10th Cir.
1941); Continental Oil Co. v. Jones, 113 F. 2d 557, 562 (10th Cir. 1940).
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degree. Very interestingly there followed ten indicia of instrumentality
with only the very slightest variance from the indicia used previously in
Deep Rock. The court here again cited Deep Rock and concluded that
the Instrumentality Principle had application in the instant case. These
cases, represented by Fish v. East, might be said to illustrate the firstglance estimate of Deep Rock, namely that all the preliminary reasoning
and indicia of instrumentality in Deep Rock meant the actual application
of the principle.
The remaining opinions are difficult to classify. The one thing that
might be said is that all indicate the same uncertainty. In St. Louis
Southwestern Ry. v. Henwood,-0 the court showed perspicacity in apparently realizing the arbitrary character of the Deep Rock subordination.
When subordination was sought the court replied that, with recovery
and the amount of recovery both uncertain, there was no proper basis
for subordinating the claims to the interests of the stockholders. It was
clear that subordination could result in a punitive blow or an overbountiful largess, depending on the real equities involved. So the court
simply remarked that subordination was out of order under the
conditions.
Some courts did not appear to see through to the core of Deep Rock.
One" cited it for disallowance of a claim asserted as part of a scheme
by a dominating stockholder to defeat the lawful prior claims of
creditors. Of course, this could be classed with the general type that
used Deep Rock as support of the Instrumentality Principle. Other
courts were able without difficulty to distinguish Deep Rock from the
facts at hand, which is the more likely procedure due to the intrinsic
difficulty of applying the Deep Rock doctrine. One of these was the
Circuit Court in the Comstock case, 2 12 which, as already indicated, stated
that the Court in Deep Rock had to deal with a situation entirely
different, and as the trial court had said, entirely contrary. Another
court621 3 cited Deep Rock for the obvious statement that if preferred
210. 157 F. 2d 337, 389, 390 (8th Cir. 1946).
211. Columbia Gas & Electric Corp. v. United State., 151 F. 2d 461, 467 (6th Cir.
1946).
212. Comstock v. Group of Institutional Investors, 163 F. 2d 330 (8th Cir. 1947). Similar to this were the words of the dissent in Geist v. Prudence Corp., 122 F. 2d 503 (1941).
The Supreme Court reversed, hence the dissent in the lower court carries some weight:
"This is not at alla case . .. as in Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 306 U. S. 307
. . . and related cases. 3" Id. at 508. Note 3 of the disenting opinion reads: "Were the
facts of this case such as to bring it within the general outlines of the rule of the Taylor
case, supra, we would be obliged to consider the significance of the cautionary comments
in Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. DuBois, March 3, 1941, 61 S. CL 675, 85 L. Ed.
982." Id. at 508.
213. In re Consolidated Rock Products Co., 114 F. 2d 102t 103 (9th Cir. 1940).
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stockholders have an equity after satisfaction of creditors they should
be considered in the plan of reorganization. Still another court, 14 cited
Deep Rock as substantiation for proper priorities in reorganization.
Perhaps the court misunderstood the misposition of the Standard claim
and the disallowance of the Deep Rock counterclaim.
In three federal court opinions the resort to Deep Rock was in support
of a straight application of general equity principles, but the results
accomplished were altogether different from the doctrine of subordination. In the first two of the cases the assets of the parent and subsidiary were commingled. (How different Deep Rock would have been
had the assets of Standard and Deep Rock been commingled.) In such
cases as these are found the more marked variances from what would
seem to be the actual Deep Rock doctrine. In the first of these cases,2 1 6
the very logical result of the illogical subordination would have taken
place had the court applied Deep Rock. Had the parent's claim been
subordinated the creditors of the subsidiary would have been paid almost
in full, yet there would have been only about 30% for the creditors of
the parent. Both parent and subsidiary were insolvent. The subsidiary
had been inadequately capitalized. Hence, to meet the manifest equities,
and aided by the application of the Instrumentality Principle, the court
pierced the corporate veil, disregarded the entities and commingled the
assets. The second 216 of these cases was about the same in principle as
the first. The facts were very complicated but the result was substantially the same. The assets were mingled again with the same divergence7
from the Deep Rock doctrine. In the third and more recent decision2'
the court cites Deep Rock for the broad principle that a court of bankruptcy under its equity powers in distributing assets may subordinate a
claim of one creditor to the claims of other creditors where the subordinated creditor has been guilty of inequitable conduct justifying subordination. The facts in the case render the citation of Deep Rock as
altogether inappropriate inasmuch as the governing rule concerned the
requirements for tracing and identifying a trust res. There was insufficient factual evidence to permit the conclusion that the court had anything in mind concerning Deep Rock beyond the most general equity
powers.
The case of In re Commonwealth Light & Power Co., 218 has been
214. Petition of Portland Electric Power Co., 162 F. 2d 618, 622 (9th Cir. 1947).
215. Stone v. Eacho, 127 F. 2d 284 (4th Cir. 1942).
216. In re Associated Gas & Electric Co., 149 F. 2d 996 (2d Cir. 1945).
217. Johnson v. Morris, 175 F. 2d 65 (10th Cir. 1949).
218. 141 F. 2d 734 (7th Cir. 1944). See also Note, The Deep Rock Doctrine: Inexorable Command or Equitable Remedy, 47 COL. L. REv. 800, 814 (1947).
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referred to as an application of the Deep Rock doctrine. Again it comes
down to a simple application of equity in an instance of mismanagement
by a completely dominating parent. There was no real subordination
but a simple disallowance of a claim. Nothing was done that was without the pale of straight equitable remedies.
In re Kansas City Journal-PostCo.,219 is a case wherein the illogicality
of subordination was clearly repudiated. This is the denouement to the
study of the opinions of the federal courts and of their approval of the
Deep Rock doctrine. The facts of the case show the fraudulent withdrawal from the bankrupt corporation's almost-defunct treasury of
$24,000 by a certain individual who had just bought the capital stock of
the bankrupt. This stockholder was also a lienholder in the amount of
$500,000. He was clearly guilty of inequity in his withdrawal of the
$24,000. The referee in bankruptcy subordinated his claim of $500,000.
The District Court reversed and was affirmed by the Circuit Court
which said:
"The referee, however, in refusing to recognize Schapiro's title under the
foreclosure sale and in subordinating his lien rights, did not, as we have pointed
out, do so for any purpose of equalizing the position of general creditors in
relation to the loss of the $24,000 to the estate. .

.

. the only purpose for

which it was in fact made, was to forfeit the lien property to the general
creditors in punishment of the inequity which the evidence justified the referee
in finding that Schapiro had actually committed. .... 220
Had the subordination of the $500,000 of the lienholder's equity been
allowed, the result would have been the loss of $500,000 by a man who
had been guilty of an inequity to the extent of $24,000 and an award to
the general creditors who had had at no time any expectation of the
property covered by the general mortgage lien. The Circuit Court did
require the return of the $24,000 fraudulently withdrawn and refused
to allow the arbitrary subordination.
A most recent citation of Deep Rock and the last of the opinions
demanding study is In re V. Loewer's Gambrinus Brewery Co.2 handed
down by the Second Circuit in 1948. The facts in the Gambrinus case
were not complex. The stockholders, officers and directors of a realty
company and a brewery company were identical-and held stock in both
firms in approximately the same proportions. Acting as the realty company the stockholders loaned money to the brewery company. In the
bankruptcy of the brewery company the realty company came in with
219. 144 F. 2d 791 (8th Cir. 1944).
220. Id. at 806.
221. 167 F. 2d 318 (2d Cir. 1948).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19

claims and asked for parity with the general creditors of the brewery
company. The debt was bona fide.
Judges Frank and Learned Hand wrote separate opinions and Judge
Swan merely concurred in the result. Judge Frank remarked the identity
of stockholders and stockholder interest and stated that the situation
should be regarded as if the brewery company were indebted directly
to its stockholders. He posed the question: "... If stockholders, acting

in concert, make loans to their corporation in amounts directly proportionate to their stockholdings, may they assert unsubordinated claims,
for such loans, against their corporation when it becomes bankrupt?"2 2
Judge Frank's reply was in the negative. The claim was not allowed
on a parity with the creditors. It is the reason behind the reply that is
of interest here.
223
Judge Frank cited Deep Rock along with the decisions in the Pepper
and Imperial Paper Corp. 4 cases as authority for this denial of parity
to the claimant shareholder-owners, stating: "The test does 'not turn
on the existence or non-existence of the debt' nor on the existence of an
'instrumentality' or the like; the test is whether failure to subordinate
will 'work injustice'. . .

."I

Judge Frank stated that since no creditors

of the realty corporation had intervened it was unnecessary to consider
whether they would be adversely affected.
The concurring opinion by Judge Hand adds to the understanding of
just how the court regarded the Deep Rock opinion and what it stood
for in relation to the Gambrinus case. Judge Hand recalled that courts
generally have held it unjust to allow a corporation to claim in insolvency
upon a parity with other creditors against another corporation, when
the shareholders of both are the same citing the Watertown Paper case.
This, he said, was based on the instrumentality principle, ".

.

. but

Taylor v. Standard Gas Co. repudiated this as a test, and said that the
question was one of 'fraud or injustice,' which left the matter wholly
at large."" 6 The italics here have been added since they indicate in a
phrase the practical result of the Deep Rock adjudication. Judge Hand
went on to say that "Pepper v. Litton perhaps re-established the earlier
statement by confining the doctrine to cases where the creditor corporation was 'a part of the stockholder's own enterprise.' "I' Judge Hand
then expatiates very appropriately and very clearly on the relative posi222.

Id. at 319.

223. P1epper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295 (1939).
224. Sampsell v. Imperial Paper Corp., 313 U. S. 215 (1941).
225. In re V. Loewer's Gambrinus Brewery Co., 167 F. 2d 318, 319 (2d Cir. 1948).
226.
227.

Id. at 320 (italics supplied).
Ibid.
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tions of shareholders and creditors in any corporate venture. "The
shareholders stand to lose first, but in return they have all the winnings
above the creditor's interest, if the venture is successful; on the other
hand the creditors have only their interest, but they come first in distribution of the assets."2- 8 There follows a stressing of the proper priorities and the injustice of allowing one person to act as both shareholder
and creditor at the same time.
In the light of the clear facts and the equally clear adjudication any
dilation on the Gainbrinus case would be unwarranted. So much has
already been said in commentary on similar situations that only the
barest summary will satisfy. The case and the words of the members of
the court speak for themselves. (1) There was no factual parity with
Deep Rock. (2) The "subordination" was not Deep Rock subordination.
In Gambrinus it was disallowance, since as shareholders the realty company received the residuum in any event. (3) There was no misposition.
The fact situation in this particular resembled the Pepper case. (4)
There was no counterclaim, no public minority stockholders, no questionable debt, no evidence of milkings. (5) The correct relation of
owner and creditor was stressed. (6) The proper priorities were endorsed. (7) Other authority than Deep Rock, more relevant, would
have sufficed. The point remains that the Gambrinus case indicates that
the most recent use of Deep Rock has brought no change, that the
uncertainty and vagueness remain, that the last application of the doctrine is no different than the first.
The total impression of the forty odd references to Deep Rock in the
Circuit Courts of Appeals is not substantially different from that received from the conspectus of Supreme Court opinions. Roughly half
dealt with wholly collateral matters of such insignificance as not to
warrant consideration. Of the remaining half, a half again put Deep
Rock down as another instance of the Instrumentality Principle and
the balance, just analyzed in detail, were apparent misconceptions in
one form or other of the Deep Rock Doctrine as originally announced
in the Deep Rock case.
The general conclusion that can be drawn from all the opinions of
the higher federal courts-Supreme and Circuit Courts-is patent. The
references to Deep Rock have in no instance achieved any purpose of
importance. In the insignificantly collateral points, the same object
could have been as well effected by other authority. In the instrumentality cases, the same could be said a fortiori. In the remaining
instances where the doctrine, as originally announced, was apparently
228. Ibid.
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misunderstood or misapplied, only confusion has resulted from the
continued use and application of the so-called doctrine.
The very fact that no court in the eleven years and fifty instances
could use the Deep Rock as really governing is notable. The courts,
then, appear to bear out the burden of this study. It remains to consider the opinions of the commentators.
The Commentators and the Doctrine
There have been roughly a dozen commentaries of one type or another
on the Deep Rock doctrine in the eleven years since the adjudication.
A perusal of these writings serves an excellent purpose in concluding
this study.
There are four outstanding points to be noted in this perusal. First,
it would seem warranted to say that no one of the dozen commentaries
presented an analysis that could be said to be generally consonant with
the thesis presented in these pages. Second, in substantially every
commentary one point or another, isolated albeit in relation to the
writer's whole treatment, could be excerpted, brought forward and
adduced in some support of the analysis here outlined, thus forming,
by a strange congeries, a totality in confirmation of a stand impugning
the Deep Rock doctrine. Third, the analyses, explanations and comments of the writers reflect exactly the opinions and comments of the
courts, as both in turn, as it were perforce, reflect the inherently questionable logic of the Deep Rock opinion itself. Fourth, no commentary
has had occasion to impugn the Deep Rock opinion or question its
general logic or equity. E contra the consensus has been clearly approbation and praise.
In 1939, immediately on handing down of the adjudication, the journals came forward with notes and recent decisions. In many respects
it would appear that the conclusions reached by these early writers
formed the basis and set the theme both in terminology and conclusion
for all of the later studies.
In an early Recent Decision,2 9 the writer, seeming to attribute to
Deep Rock an endorsement of absolute priorities in bankruptcy, began
with: "The decision seems to be an application of the rule of the Boyd
case. . .. );230 This sentence summarizes the writer's conclusions. The
discussion, moreover, was based on the assumption that the Standard
claim was actually disallowed. This brief commentary closed with the
229.
230.

(1913).

38 MICH. L. REv. 88 (1939).
Ibid. The Boyd case referred to is Northern Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482
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statement that ".
the result reached in the principal case is eminently
proper."1
= "
About the same time a Recent Decision in the Virginia Law Review
showed the same inclination to regard the Deep Rock adjudication as
consonant with the rule in the Boyd case. It should be noted, however,
that this writer did show concern for the manner in which the Boyd rule
was treated. "The Supreme Court did not deny the status of creditor. . . ."3
The writer then adds: "But ordinarily a parent's valid
claim as creditor is barred only by showing that the two corporations
are in fact one."134 Here, although the validity of the claim is assumed,
the recognition of the unusual approach in Deep Rock showed an insight into the doctrine which the unqualified assertion of application
of tfie Boyd rule, above, did not indicate. In general, however, this
note manifested the same uncertainty as to the exact nature of thp
Deep Rock doctrine. The writer remarked the fact that the court cited
"... neither precedent nor principle ... ."I and this realization, especially that no principle had been cited, is most important. In the end,
however, the broader issues of misposition and disregard of counterclaim
were not noted. The writer decided that the case ". . . apparently extends the application of estoppel properly to prevent the return of control
to those whose mismanagement caused the insolvency, and to protect
the previously impotent stockholders."" 0
In the same year, 1939, a Note in the Illinois Law Review felt the
Deep Rock case was decided on
"... the 'equitable principle that the doctrine of corporate entity, recognized
generally and for most purposes, will not be regarded when so to do would
work fraud or injustice.' "23T

It is not to be expected that writers would proceed in any wise differently from the courts in their interpretation. Hence this conclusion that
Deep Rock was based on the Instrumentality Principle is not unusual.
After this rather clear statement, the Note added a distinction without
an apparent difference: "The Court rejected the instrumentality doctrine as a 'rule' but accepted it as a principle for making equitable
adjustments in reorganizations."218 In view of the inherent difficulty
231. Ibid.
232.

25 VA. L. REV. 849 (1939).

233.
234.
235.
236.

Id. at 850.
Ibid. (italics supplied).
Ibid.
Ibid. (italics supplied).

237.

Note, Disposition of Parent's Claim in Reorgani:ation of the Subsidiary, 34 IM

L. REv. 94 (1939).
238. Id. at 95.
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in understanding the Deep Rock adjudication, this remark would seem
to reflect the holding itself. The writer concluded that
is acceptable ...
,239

"...

the result

Of the four early commentaries, Cornell's Earle B. Henley, Jr. came
the closest to the full appreciation of the situation.2 40 He recognized
that the Court did not apply the Instrumentality Doctrine. He further
appreciated the fact that there was no real reason given for the
subordination:
"The court refused either to apply the instrumentality rule or to disregard
the corporate fiction, but held that under the bankruptcy act, as a court of
equity, it was 'required to recognize the rights and status of the preferred
stockholders arising out of Standard's wrongful and injurious conduct in the
mismanagement of Deep Rock's affairs.' "241
Although this writer appreciated some of the limitations of the opinion
he nevertheless failed to discuss the basic deficiencies and indicated no
dissatisfaction with the manner in which the Court had acted as a court
of equity. He felt that the Court attained the same result as if it had
used the Instrumentality Doctrine.2 42 Probably the most incisive and
enlightened reflection in Henley's commentary was his remark on the
predictability of future application:
"The difficulty with the court's decision in the instant case is the lack of any
definite, certain rule by which to predict the outcome of any similar case. The
court makes no attempt to point 243
out what factual basis will justify the exercise
of this power of subordination."
In this Henley put his finger on the basic illogicality which must inevitably offer difficulty in application.
One of the most interesting works that treated Deep Rock was written by one not a lawyer. 44 Speaking more properly in his own field the
writer expresses the need, noted throughout these pages, of a full
accounting and investigation of the history of the various intercompany
transactions:
"In these days only an item by item analysis and adjustment can balance
equities ....

Corporate histories can be reconstructed with sufficient accuracy

to meet the needs ....

"245

239. Id. at 96.
24 CORNELL L. Q. 587 (1939).
241. Id. at 588.
242. Id. at 589.
243. Ibid.
244. Field, The Instrumentality Doctrine in Reorganizations of Subsidiary Corporations,
9 Am. L. ScHooL REv. 728 (1940).
245. Id. at 733.
240.
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Yet this writer was indignant at the decision, not because of the illogic
of allowance, nor of subordination, but because Standard was not given
its full $9,000,000 ahead of everyone:
"Subordination of claims in these cases is arbitrary and capricious. It is
punitive rather than compensatory. It smacks more of bills of attainder and
of Hitler's levy on the Jews than it does of calm weighing of equities.' '24
The last article in 1939 came from the hand of Charles Rembar of
New York." There is much valuable collateral matter here, but the
treatment of Deep Rock is wholly consonant with all that has already
been considered, and reflects the same difficulties encountered by the
courts and writers. The author does, however, note the counterclaim,
but in the matter of the foundation of the Court's conclusion, he too is
seemingly misled by the Court's redenomination of the concept of
instrumentality. He states: "The Supreme Court noted the rule and
dismissed it."24'
The article did point out the novelty of analysis in
Deep Rock. "The opinion, disdaining precedent, took an approach altogether different from that of previous claims cases.... " But the writer
took no exception to this approach, since he concluded that: "In dealing
with this problem, the court shows common sense remarkable against
the background of the entity-instrumentality doctrine."" 0 Nor did
Rembar fail to note the unusual nature of the misposition: "On the contrary, well-known principles of priority in reorganization would require
that Standard's claim be taken care of before stockholders received
anything."" 1 The writer analyzed the Court's use of the word "equity"
in these words:
"What the Court meant was that it found the instrumentality, adjunct, alter
ego, talk not at all helpful, and that the dominant consideration in dealing with
a parent's claim was fairness."' 252
3
The writer's conclusion was that "the result was salutary."
Once these initial commentaries had appeared the pattern of what was
henceforward to be said on the matter of Deep Rock was settled. There
are few deviations from this pattern, either by notes, comments or
articles. It would be wastefully repetitious to consider them in detail.
246. Id. at 732.
247. Rembar, Claims Against Affilhiated Companies in Reorganization, 39 Cor.. L. RM.,
907 (1939).

248. Id. at 924.
249. Ibid.
250. Id. at 930.
251.
252.

Id. at 925.
Ibid.

253.

Id. at 931.
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In 1941 a Harvard Law Review Note25 4 concurred in the general
analysis. It contemned "the unilluminating practice" of the Instrumentality Rule, and attributed such attitude of contempt to the Court.
Its most helpful contribution was the general conclusion that: "The
exact nature of this subordination was doubtful after the Deep Rock
case.)) 5 An article in the Columbia Law Review in 1942210 by Myron
Krotinger anticipated excellent results from the Deep Rock opinion and
is otherwise consistent with the set pattern. In that same year, Carlos
Israels remarks in another Deep Rock article: "On present indications,
the future of the doctrine is wholly speculative. 20 7 In fact Israels did
stress the questionable predictability of the doctrine, although his
analysis is essentially the same as the others. On another point Israels
showed penetration to the basic issues:
"The important fact is that in the Deep Rock Case there was no judgment
and no precise determination of the amount of anyclaim which Deep Rock
might have had against Standard. No one examining the record could doubt
that a reasonable basis for a substantial claim existed." 2 s8
This was the most forthright reference to the counterclaim found in any
of the Deep Rock commentaries.
A Note" 9 in the Columbia Law Review in 1947 reiterated much that
had been said before and generally approved of the holding.
The latest commentary on Deep Rock was somewhat obiter to the
present study since it concerned itself in the main with the Comstock
opinion. The Note appeared in 1949 as "Limiting the Deep Rock
Doctrine, ' "2- and treated Comstock in relation to the Deep Rock doctrine. Implicit throughout were many of the same concepts expressed
by the previous writers and there was nothing to characterize this discussion as a marked departure from the past. This can be seen passim
throughout. Thus the author refers to disallowance of the claim as
apparently an expression of the Deep Rock holding and would seem to
indicate that all the public investors were protected in Deep Rock, thus
ignoring the plight of the publicly-held common stock. The Note refers
Note, 54 HARV. L. REV. 1045 (1941).
Id. at 1049.
256. Krotinger, The "Deep Rock" Doctrine: A Realistic Approach to Parent-Subsidiary
Law, 42 COL. L. Rav. 1124 (1942).
257. Israels, The Implications and Limitations of the "Deep Rock" Doctrine, 42 CoL.
L. REV. 376, 391 (1942).
258. Id. at 390.
259. Note, The Deep Rock Doctrine: Inexorable Command or Equitable Remedy, 47
COL. L. Rzv. 800 (1947).
260. Note, Limiting the Deep Rock Doctrine, 58 YALE L. J. 773 (1949).
254.
255.
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to the Deep Rock doctrine and states that the Comstock case "... may
in fact represent its first significant limitation." 20
' 1 The Note further
remarks that "... Deep Rock sets up a system of equitable priorities
in bankruptcy to supplement the system of absolute priorities."2 2 And
in another place: "Flexibly applied to require responsible management
for the subsidiary, the Deep Rock doctrine can equitably resolve the
conflict of interests in the holding company structure ."2 Here and at
other points the author indicates that he feels the doctrine is basically
sound.
Conclusion
It is finally submitted that this study substantiates the original thesis
that: (1) the Deep Rock doctrine essentially impugns, or even repudiates, the Instrumentality Principle or at the least fails to carry it through
to its reasonable conclusion; (2) that, because of questionable logic at
the foundation of the Deep Rock opinion, the formulation of any working principle as an expression of the Deep Rock holding is at best
fraught with danger; (3) that this intrinsically questionable logicality
renders prediction by the use of any formulation uncertain and confused; (4) that consequent on these points, the most prudent and
guarded course would be, it is submitted, abandonment of the holding
as a doctrine capable of accurate and intelligent application to facts
and circumstances in litigation.
261.

Id. at 774.

262. Id. at 774 n. 5.
263. Id. at 781.

